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Comparative developmental psychology is a perspective with which we can view the 
similarities and differences in developmental processes that occur across primate species.  My 
developmental area of specialty is infancy, and I find topics involving emotion particularly 
interesting.  As a developmental psychologist, I ask questions about how the emotional system of 
chimpanzees develops, and in particular, I am interested in how developmental outcomes change 
as a function of social-cultural environments (e.g., Bard, 2005).  Comparative psychologists are 
interested in similarities and differences across species in order to address questions of species-
unique characteristics or characteristics shared by species based on evolutionary history.  The 
last common ancestor (LCA) of humans, chimpanzees, and monkeys lived approximately 30 
million years ago and the LCA of humans and chimpanzees lived approximately 7 million years 
ago (e.g., Steiper & Young, 2006), which means that humans and chimpanzees have 23 million 
years of shared evolutionary history.  In fact, I am interested in how developmental processes of 
chimpanzees compare to developmental process of humans. To determine those characteristics 
that are uniquely human, those that are uniquely chimpanzee, or those shared by humans and 
chimpanzees, a comparative approach must be combined with the study of development across 
species (Bullowa, 1979; Johnson-Pynn, Fragaszy, & Cummins-Sebree, 2003). 
The most common question that I am asked is ‘How does the development of 
chimpanzees compare to that of humans?’.  The desired answer is typically a cross-species 
comparison on a single dimension, e.g., ‘the chimpanzee’ is like a 2-year-old human.  The 
scientific answer, however, is quite a bit more complex, because it depends upon which 
dimension is chosen, both for control and for comparison.  Chimpanzees, like humans, show 
developmental changes in motor skills, in emotionality, in cognition, and in social skills.  The 
outcomes within these domains vary as a function of ‘lived experiences’ (i.e., sometimes called 
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rearing, or learning, or eco-cultural experiences, or simply environment).  Moreover, outcomes 
in infancy form the foundational skills for adult competencies.  In this chapter, I provide the 
broad strokes of a comparative developmental answer to the question of how the development of 
chimpanzees compares to that of humans, with a special focus on the role of engagement.     
 The study of young infants makes somewhat easier the task of comparing development 
across species, and of understanding common developmental processes (which is my main goal).  
To understand developmental processes, we need to understand the influences of maturation, 
social-cultural environments, and of evolutionary history on outcomes (e.g., Jablonka & Lamb, 
2007).  Combining a comparative perspective with truly developmental study allows us to 
address the flexibility and plasticity in outcomes.  In this chapter, I review a number of studies 
highlighting the relevance of this developmental approach to topics that are of interest to 
comparative psychologists, primatologists, evolutionary biologists, etc..  The conclusion is that 
social cognition has an important developmental history of lived experiences.  
 The idea that one can pinpoint an age for ‘the chimpanzee’ to equate them to ‘the human’ 
of a certain age is perpetuated (repeatedly) in the comparative literature (Leavens & Bard, 2010).  
Part of the problem is that outcomes from ‘chimpanzees’, usually adults, are compared to 
outcomes of ‘humans’, typically 2 year-old infants (e.g., Herrmann, Herrnandez-Lloreda, Call, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2009).  When authors find that chimpanzees performed less well on a 
particular task than 2.5 yr humans, the assumption is that ‘chimpanzees’ are not as good as 2.5 
yr-old humans.  Of course to make conclusions of species differences (if one could control the 
additional confounds of rearing, for example), the addition of adult humans and chimpanzee 
infants are required (to have an appropriate experimental design to test for main effects of 
species and age at testing, and to test for the interaction of species by age: Leavens, Hopkins, & 
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Bard, 2005, 2008).  I resolve this problem by testing chimpanzees and humans at the same 
developmental age, choosing to equate the groups on duration of post-natal lived experiences.  In 
this review, I discuss the effects of early experiences (i.e., engagement) on numerous milestones 
in development: 1) newborn neurobehavioral integrity; 2) early social cognitive processes such 
as primary intersubjectivity, neonatal imitation, and mutual gaze; 3) emotional expressions and 
social referencing; 4) attachment; and 5) self-awareness.  With this database, I highlight the 
relevance of rearing histories (of lived experiences) to the development of social cognition in 
chimpanzees, and hence, the importance of developmental studies to comparative psychology 
(see also Boesch, 2007; Bjorklund, 2006; Burghardt, 2009; Suomi, 2006). 
Characteristics of newborns 
In this section, I address the question of how chimpanzees and humans compare at birth.  
First, we should compare gestational age.  Full-term age in humans is approximately 266 days, or 
38 weeks, when measured from conception to birth, and average full-term age for chimpanzees is 
approximately 225 days, or 32 weeks from the day of ovulation to birth (e.g., Wallis, 1997).  
This is corrected for that fact that typically, for humans, the length of pregnancy is measured 
from the last menstrual period until birth (adding 2 weeks = 40 weeks of pregnancy), whereas for 
chimpanzees (as in most non-human animals) pregnancy is measured from ovulation to birth.  
So, when compared from conception to birth, humans have a longer period of in utero 
development than chimpanzees, on the order of 6 weeks. 
Secondly, we should compare the sizes of infants at birth.  Newborn chimpanzees weigh 
1.5kg on average or 3% of their adult weight (Fragaszy & Bard, 1995).  Newborn humans weigh 
3.25kg (7 lbs 4oz) on average or 4% of their adult weight (approximated for US males and 
females combined).   It is interesting to note that DeSilva & Lesnik (2006) estimate that 
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chimpanzees’ brains have reached 35-40% of their adult growth at birth, and that the brain size 
of human newborns is 25-30% of their adult size.  Thus, chimpanzees have a shorter in utero 
period, weigh less at birth, but have relatively more brain growth than human newborns. 
Chimpanzees have inborn capacities for emotional engagement with caregivers, and 
possess developmental processes, such as neonatal imitation and primary intersubjectivity, by 
which emotional experiences become integrated in communication and cognition.  The 
remainder of this section reviews these inborn capacities in chimpanzees and comes to the 
surprising conclusion that from birth through the first month, the neurobehavioral integrity and 
other expressions of inborn capacity of newborn chimpanzees are not easily distinguished from 
newborn humans (see review in Bard, Brent, Lester, Worobey, & Suomi, in press). 
Neonatal Neurobehavioral Integrity  
This section concerns neonatal neurobehavioral integrity, as measured by the Neonatal 
Behavioral Assessment Scale (NBAS:, also known as ‘the Brazelton’, most recently Brazelton & 
Nugent, 1995).  The NBAS is a widely used instrument for clinical and for research purposes.  
The NBAS is used to assess many realms of newborn organization and functioning, including 
orientation, motor performance, reflexes.  I find it particularly useful because it assesses the early 
functioning of emotional systems, specifically related to behavioral state arousal and behavioral 
state regulation.  Additionally it is useful because it is designed to assess the current functioning 
of the newborn, in response to the challenges of the post-uterine environment.  The NBAS test is 
a tool to observe early adaptations by infants to the demands of different environments. 
Initially, I compared human newborns with the first 13 chimpanzee infants that I tested 
with the NBAS, from 1987-1990.  These infants were raised in the standard care nursery (for 
details see Bard & Gardner, 1996, and below). The most important finding was that newborn 
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chimpanzees were measurable with the NBAS test, without modification.  I had trained on the 
NBAS with human newborns and on a modified ‘monkey brazelton’ (from Suomi’s lab) which 
included modified  items from the NBAS, but also included some modified items from the 
Bayley Scales of Infant Development (Bayley, 1969), i.e., items used for 3-5month-old human 
infants.  I expected that the monkey version would be more useful with chimpanzees than the 
human version.  But, I was wrong.  The human version of the NBAS was the one that I used with 
chimpanzee newborns, without a single administrative change.  Here I review five clusters of 
behavioral organization: orientation, motor performance, range of state, state regulation, and 
autonomic nervous system stability.  Of course, a requirement of all NBAS examiners is that the 
tester be sensitive to the newborn and work to obtain their best performance (for more details and 
review of previous studies see Bard, Brent, Lester, Worobey, & Suomi, 2010). 
Orientation: Newborn chimpanzees and newborn humans are able to follow visually 
presented stimuli across two 30 degree horizontal movements.  Newborn chimpanzees and 
newborn humans are able to alert to, turn their head toward, and search for auditory stimuli.  In 
general, visual and auditory orientations are better to social stimuli than to inanimate stimuli, for 
both species.  Initially, it appeared that chimpanzee newborns were alert more often and for 
longer durations (up to 30 seconds each period) than human newborns (who sustained alertness 
up to10-15 seconds each period).  The 7 items were averaged into an Orientation Cluster score.  
There was no group difference and no developmental change from 2 to 30 days of age. 
Motor:  In the five motor items and the Motor Performance Cluster scores part of the 
NBAS, I was surprised to find only one species difference in head control.  Newborn human and 
chimpanzees had muscle tone that increased when handled but was neither hyper- or hypotonic.  
In terms of motor maturity, amount of spontaneous and elicited activity, and specific motor 
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movements (defensive reaction), there were no species differences noted, but there was 
significant development from 2 to 30 days of age (for both humans and chimpanzees).   
Arousal:  Nursery-reared chimpanzees rarely cried for 15 seconds, and if they did cry, it 
was at the end of the exam (humans cried with handling in the first 8 minutes of the exam, and 
they tended to cry more than twice).  In these early analyses, we found that chimpanzee 
newborns were significantly less aroused than humans. 
State Regulation: Chimpanzee newborns are incredibly responsive to being held.  
Whereas human newborns typically mold and relax into the arms of the examiner, chimpanzee 
newborns additionally nestle their face into the examiner’s neck and cling to the examiner.    
Some chimpanzee newborns, like some human newborns, are also able to bring their hand, fist, 
or thumb to their mouth for sucking and self-quieting.  There were no group differences on the 
scores of self-quieting, consolability, or hand-to-mouth ability.  Initially, however, I found a 
difference in the State Regulation cluster scores, with nursery chimpanzees have significantly 
better state regulation than human newborns. 
Autonomic Stability: This cluster includes signs of stress affecting the autonomic nervous 
system, specifically the number of startles, and tremors (changes in skin color was not 
measured).  Chimpanzees and humans showed different patterns of developmental change.   
Comparing the one group of chimpanzee newborns to the one group of human newborns, 
I summarized differences in terms of differences in behavioral state organization.  But recently, 
my colleagues and I conducted a sort of meta-analysis, statistically comparing NBAS data 
collected from chimpanzee newborns raised in four different environments to human newborns, 
and arrived at different conclusions (Bard et al., 2010).  There were three nursery-raised 
chimpanzee groups, two from the Yerkes Research Center nursery at Emory University (standard 
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care- ST- and responsive care- RC), and one group raised at the Southwest Foundation for 
Biomedical Research (SW).  The three nursery settings (for chimpanzee infants whose mothers 
did not have sufficient maternal skills) differed in terms of their rearing practices and 
socialization goals.  Briefly, the ST nursery consisted of groups of 4 to 6 infants of the same age 
together constantly (24/7), with intermittent contact with human animal care technicians for 
feeding & cleaning (scheduled once every 4 hours).  In the RC nursery, there was an additional 
contact with specially trained research assistants (for 4 continuous hours per day, 5 days a week), 
who nurtured the socio-emotional and communicative development of each infant (Bard, 1996).  
The SW nursery was similar to the Yerkes ST nursery, with infrequent contact, but animal care 
technicians consistently wore biosafety masks and gloves, and had very limited cradling contact 
with the chimpanzees.  An additional group of chimpanzees were reared by their biological 
mothers (Mo), with constant cradling contact (24/7), except for the 2 times that they were 
temporarily ‘borrowed’ from their mothers and given NBAS tests at 2 and 28 days (Hallock, 
Worobey, & Self, 1989).  The chimpanzees groups were compared with one human group, 
reared by their biological mothers, in a middle- to upper middle-class, urban part of Providence 
RI, USA (see Lester et al., 1989 for full details).  All infants were assessed using the same tool, 
the NBAS, tested by certified examiners, at the same ages, 2 day and 28 days. 
This cross-species analysis with multiple chimpanzee groups revealed very different 
findings from the original comparison between a single group of chimpanzees and of humans.  
On the second post natal day, the human group was significantly different from all the 
chimpanzees groups in only 3 of 25 scores, specifically in alertness, in muscle tone, and pull-to-
sit (from 8 scores in orientation, 6 scores in motor performance, 5 scores in range of state, 5 
scores in state regulation, and the single score of smiling). On day 30, there was only a single 
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difference that distinguished the human group from all the chimpanzee groups, and it was muscle 
tone, with the chimpanzees significantly more hypertonic than the human newborns.  On the 
remaining 24 of 25 NBAS scores at 30 days, the human group was not distinct.  Moreover, there 
was not a simple explanation for the pattern of group differences.   This range in chimpanzee 
neonatal behavioral outcomes encompassed the neonatal behavioral outcomes found in the 
human group.  “In terms of describing chimpanzee newborns, we conclude that how they 
performed depended to a large degree on what they have experienced. ” (Bard et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in comparing chimpanzee newborns to human newborns, now I would 
summarize by saying that it is very difficult to find species differences.  In fact, in the analyses 
that I report above, only a single human group was used to compare with the multiple 
chimpanzee groups.  There are significant cross-group differences in humans as well (e.g., 
Nugent, Lester, & Brazelton, 1989), especially in range of state, state regulation, and some motor 
performance.  Therefore, the degree to which the neonatal system matures in interaction with 
specific features of the post-natal environment illustrates the flexibility inherent in the genome of 
chimpanzees and humans to respond to particular types of emotional engagements. 
Neonatal imitation 
Imitative behaviors differ across primate species:  There are a few examples of imitation 
in newborn rhesus monkeys (see chapter by Ferrari), but quite a lot of instances of imitation in 
chimpanzees from infancy through adulthood (see review by Myowa-Yamakoshi, 2006).  
Additionally, it’s clear that imitative abilities differ across development: newborns don't copy 
their parent banging a hammer, for example, but 2-year-olds just might.  Imitative abilities in 
nonhuman primates need to be viewed from both comparative and developmental perspectives.  
Here, I present an overview of research on neonatal imitation in chimpanzees (from Bard, 2007).    
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 We used two procedures to assess imitation in healthy full-term chimpanzee newborns: 
one was very rigid and standardized, the other was both communicative and interactive.  In the 
structured procedure, the chimpanzee infant was placed facing the adult human demonstrator.  
The adult human followed a predetermined order of demonstration: either Mouth Opening (MO) 
first and Tongue Protrusion (TP) second, or TP first and MO second.  There were 4 presentations 
of the first demonstrated action within a 20-second period, followed by a passive face for 20 
seconds, and this lasted for the first 4 minutes.  Immediately thereafter, the second demonstrated 
action was given in the same cycle of 4 demonstrations within a 20-second period, followed by 
20 seconds of a passive face.  From the beginning through the entire 8-minute session, the 
actions of the adult human were completely determined by the structure of the test and did not 
change regardless of the actions of the infant.  Using the Structured procedure, all 5 chimpanzees 
matched one of the modeled actions, but none matched both actions (see Table 1).   
 In the Interactive procedure, the infant was either held or laid comfortably within arm's 
reach.  The order of modeled actions were determined in advance, just like in the Structured 
procedure.  However, the number of presentations depended on the infant’s response.  The first 
demonstrated action was presented and a 5s pause allowed the infant to respond.  If the infant 
emitted any of the target actions, then this was considered the infant's response, and the 
demonstration concluded.  If the infant did not respond, up to five repetitions of the 
demonstrated action were given.  After the infant responded, or after 5 demonstrations, there was 
a 10s pause, before the next action was demonstrated. The series of modeled actions was 
provided twice, so that the infants had two opportunities to exhibit imitation of each action. 
 In the Interactive procedure, we used three modeled actions: MO, TP, and Tongue Clicks 
(TC).  The MO and TP models were identical to those in the Structured procedure. One 
Bard         12 
 
demonstration of a TC included three rhythmic clicks, a rather complex model of both sound 
production and a series of three actions.  Using the Interactive  procedure, one subject matched 
one modeled action, three subjects matched two modeled actions, and one subject matched all 
three modeled actions (Table 1). 
        The best performance in neonatal imitation was given by Lindsey, when she was 7 days old.  
During the first presentation of TC, she listened and occasionally looked at the model during the 
first 4 demonstrations, and then with the fifth demonstration, after a pause, she emitted a single 
tongue click.  During the second pass, and again after the fourth demonstration of TC, she 
responded.  But this time, she imitated the series of three actions, (2 MOs) and matched a TC.    
  When chimpanzees are 7-11 days of age, imitation was exhibited in both the Structured 
and Interactive procedures by all 5 chimpanzees (Bard 2007: Table 1).  Imitation of facial 
expressions by chimpanzee neonates appears to represent a capacity to engage in 
intersubjectivity that is similar to that of human infants.  Furthermore, 4 of 5 subjects performed 
better in the Interactive paradigm, indicating that chimpanzees share with humans a 
developmental mechanism (i.e., neonatal imitation) that may allow outcomes to be highly 
influenced by early interactive experiences.  
Emotional Expressions 
How do chimpanzees and humans compare in their development of emotional 
expressions?  In the first 30 days of life, chimpanzees, like humans, express happiness with 
movements of the mouth.  We call this smiling if matching the emotion across species.  We call 
the facial expressions something different, however, if we are matching on facial movement 
morphology (i.e., with a standardized coding of facial action units, such as with ChimpFACS: 
Vick, Waller, Parr, Smith Pasqualini, & Bard, 2007).  Chimpanzee infants express happiness 
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with an open mouth expression, a playface, whereas human infants express happiness most often 
with lip corners being raised, although humans also have open mouth smiles (e.g., Messinger, 
2002) and chimpanzees also raise their lip corners (Thorsteinsson & Bard, 2009; Vick et al., 
2007).  Given the same positive context, say of a caregiver vocalizing to an infant while tickling, 
the prototypic facial movements of human and chimpanzee infant might look very much the 
same (compare the large smile of the human infant in Oster, 2005, p.281 with the big playface of 
the chimpanzee infant in peek-a-boo in Bard, 2005, p.47).  But note that these are 3 month-old 
infants, although newborns also smile (see Table 2).  Of course, chimpanzee newborns and 
human newborns cry and fuss with distinctive facial expressions and vocalizations (see Bard, 
2000 for details of crying in chimpanzees).  We found species-typical chimpanzee vocalizations 
of greeting, threat bark, and alarm call occurred in some chimpanzees during the newborn 
period, although not all occurred in appropriate contexts (see Bard 2003, 1996 for more details). 
We know that the chimpanzee emotional system, like the human emotional system, 
develops in interaction with the social environment (Bard, 2005).   Beginning in the neonatal 
period, chimpanzee infants, like human infants, smile in response to familiar caregivers in face-
to-face contexts (see also Tomonaga, 2006).  By 30 days of age, chimpanzees raised in a nursery 
by humans smile significantly more often than do mother-raised chimpanzees, when tested by a 
human examiner (Bard, 2005).  Perhaps most interesting is that human infants (from middle-
class American) smile more than mother-raised chimpanzees but less than nursery-raised 
chimpanzees at 30 days of age (Bard et al., 2010).   
Socio-emotional experiences can impact the development of negative emotional 
expressions.  The amount of crying and fussing in chimpanzees varies as a function of rearing 
experiences: Two groups of nursery-reared chimpanzees differed significantly in the amount of 
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fussing and crying evident in the second month of life (Bard, 2000); and extended periods of 
crying occurred much more rarely in nursery-raised chimpanzees compared to mother-raised 
chimpanzees, when given the NBAS standardized test (e.g., Bard et al., 2010).  Interestingly, by 
21 days of age, on average, some chimpanzee newborns displaying angry faces, although there 
was a significant difference in occurrence as a function of the early rearing environment (Bard, 
2003).  Therefore, it is clear that a variety of emotional expressions, both facial and vocal, occur 
in young chimpanzees, but the prevalence or even the age of onset may vary widely as a function 
of the socio-emotional environment in which chimpanzees are developing. 
Characteristics of 3 month-olds 
Intersubjectivity is Trevarthen’s (1979) term for the human infants’ ability to adapt their 
own purposeful acts to the subjectivity of others.  Primary intersubjectivity is most often seen in 
face-to-face interactions of parents with their very young infants.  One question that has 
motivated much of my research relates to whether chimpanzee infants, like human infants, are 
born with this capacity for intersubjectivity.  Four strands of evidence are required to conclude 
that humans, or chimpanzees have primary intersubjectivity, including: 1) neonatal imitation ; 2) 
mutual gaze; 3) the extent to which emotional behaviors can acquire communicative meaning; 
and 4) the degree of flexibility in emotional and/or communicative meanings (i.e., based on 
differences in early rearing).   If we find evidence of each in chimpanzees, then we might 
conclude that primary intersubjectivity was a capacity common to the great ape – human lineage 
(for further discussion of this topic see Bard, 2009).   
In order to enter into a communicative system, it is required than an individual has 
behaviors that can assume communicative meaning.  These meaningful behaviors can develop 
from the most basic elements of neonatal behavior, such as crying, and alert attention.  I 
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observed chimpanzee mothers with their newborn infants, and found that they spend time 
engaged in face-to-face interactions with their infants.  They spend lots of time in 
communicative, tactile games (Bard, 1994; Bard, 2002).  Primary intersubjectivity appears to be 
expressed in social games in chimpanzees.  For example, Sheena, when she was 3 months of age 
was assessed with a NBAS exam, the item where a cloth is placed lightly covering the face.  She 
pulled the cloth down and smiled at us, initiating a game of peek-a-boo.  We replaced the cloth 
over her face and when she pulled it down the second time, her smile was even broader.  Nursery 
chimpanzees are active partners in social games (see Figure 2.8 in Bard, 2005). 
 So, there is evidence that young chimpanzees have neonatal imitation, have behaviors 
that assume communicative meaning (i.e., emotional expressions), and there is some evidence 
already from the newborn period that socialization exerts a powerful influence on the 
development of emotional expressions in chimpanzees.  What about one other marker of primary 
intersubjectivity, that is mutual gaze? 
Mutual gaze 
 In chimpanzee mother-infant interactions at the Yerkes Research Center, there are 
between 8 and 10 instances of mutual gaze in an hour.  That level is steady as the infant grows 
from 2-4 weeks, to 6-8 weeks, and 10-12 weeks of age.  This is in marked contrast to my 
observation of the skills of infant chimpanzees raised in the Yerkes nurseries, that is, interacting 
with human partners.  In the nursery, I was impressed with infant chimpanzee’s ability to engage 
in emotionally meaningful, face-to-face interactions, with extended periods of mutual gaze.   
By using an approach that combined a developmental perspective (describing changes in 
mutual gaze in the first 3 months of life) with comparative data (documenting mutual gaze and 
intuitive parenting behaviors across different groups and across species), my colleagues and I 
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explored developmental prerequisites and correlates of mutual gaze in chimpanzees (Bard et al., 
2005). This study confirmed previous evidence that mutual gaze occurs in mother-raised 
chimpanzees (16.9 times per hour).  Moreover, mutual gaze occurred in chimpanzees at all ages 
sampled, and at both centers, but, we found different developmental of mutual gaze in the two 
groups of chimpanzee mother-infants pairs.  There was a significantly higher rate of mutual gaze 
in the mother-infant pairs residing at the Primate Institute of Kyoto University (PRI) compared 
with mother-infant pairs residing at the Yerkes Research Center of Emory University (PRI: M = 
22 +3.4 mutual gaze bouts per hour; Yerkes M = 11.8 +2.1 mutual gaze bouts per hour).   
 It appeared that mothers at PRI were actively encouraging mutual gaze by tilting or 
holding up the infant's chin with her finger while looking into her infants eyes.  This behavior 
occurred in each of the PRI mothers with their 3-month-old infant, but was not observed to occur 
in any Yerkes chimpanzee mother.   We found that the rate of mutual gaze was significantly and 
inversely correlated with percent of time spent cradling 3-month-old infants.    Reduced face-to-
face interactions, and reduced amounts of mutual gaze are reported in some human cultures that 
have increased physical contact with infants, compared with Western norms (reviewed in Bard et 
al., 2005; Keller, 2007).   In an experimental study (Lavelli & Fogel, 2002) with human infants, 
mutual gaze increased when 2- and 3-month-old infants were out-of-contact compared with 
being held by their mothers.  Thus, the enculturation process of intuitive parenting behavior in 
chimpanzees, thus, appears strikingly similar to the process used by humans.   
 We proposed The Interchangeability Hypothesis (Bard et al., 2005) to explain variations 
of mutual engagement based in physical contact without mutual gaze (the basic primate system, 
also found in traditional human societies: Keller, 2007), or on mutual gaze without high levels of 
physical contact (an evolutionary derived system, found in middle-class human societies.  My 
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observations of nursery chimpanzees fits in nicely as those chimpanzees raised by human 
caregivers are most often out of physical contact, and they have the highest levels of mutual gaze 
among 3-month-old chimpanzees studied to date.  There is a range in mutual engagement, 
explainable by the same development mechanism, active in chimpanzees and humans (e.g., Bard 
et al., 2005: Keller, 2007: Plooij, 1984).  Furthermore, by identifying a similar developmental 
process that accounts for higher (and lower) amounts of mutual gaze, we confirm further 
evidence for primary intersubjectivity in chimpanzees.   
Early cognition and social cognition (6-9 months of age). 
The most widely used assessment of early cognition in human infants is the Bayley 
Scales of Development (reviewed in Bard & Gardner, 1996).  My research team administered the 
Bayley test to chimpanzee infants raised in the three nursery settings of the Yerkes Research 
Centre of Emory University (Bard & Gardner, 1996; van IJzendoorn, Bard, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & Ivan, 2009).  At 3-5 months of age, chimpanzees oriented well to sights and 
sounds, and grasped and mouthed object, scoring significantly well above human infants of the 
same age (humans M = 100 SD 16; chimpanzees M > 130).  By 6-7 months, the chimpanzees 
from both ST and RC nurseries were still scoring significantly above humans of the same age.  
At 8-9 months the chimpanzees overall were not different from 8-9 month human infants.  But 
by 10-12 months, when turn-taking, pointing to the parts of a doll, and completing puzzle boards 
were required, the chimpanzees scored significantly lower than 10-12 month-old humans.   
Once again, we found differences among the chimpanzee nursery groups.  At 9 months, 
for example, the responsive care (RC) chimpanzees scored higher than 9-month-old human 
infants, but the standard care (ST) chimpanzees score lower than the humans (van IJzendoorn et 
al., 2009).   Moreover, the chimpanzees that experienced early stress performed significantly less 
well on the BSID throughout the first year of life, with a spike of fearful anxiety during testing at 
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6-7 months.  It is evident that the institutionalized rearing was responsible for many of the poor 
cognitive outcomes in year-old chimpanzees, as their rearing was impoverished (see e.g., van 
IJzendoorn et al., 2009; Racine, Leavens, Susswein, & Wereha, 2008), especially compared to 
that of typical middle-class urban human infants, for whom the Bayley tests were devised. 
Object manipulation & cooperative motivations 
It is interesting that the extent to which parents use objects in their interactions with 
young human infants varies widely across eco-cultural contexts.  Keller and colleagues (2007) 
have demonstrated that for 3-month-old infants living in rural subsistence eco-cultures, objects 
are much less often the focus of interactions (less than 1% of waking time v 2.5 % in urban 
settings), and body contact is much more often experienced (~80% in rural Nso v 43% in urban 
German infants: p.258).   Bakeman, Adamson, Konner, & Barr (1990) found !Kung caregivers 
most often gave objects to their infants as a distraction, so that the caregivers can carry on with 
their work undisturbed by infants.  Menzel (1964) found that chimpanzees raised in isolation 
exhibited extreme fear when they first encountered novel objects, and early rearing had an 
impact on tool use (Menzel, Davenport, & Rogers, 1970).  Thus, it is clear that (the lack of) 
previous experience with objects has a long-term effect on chimpanzee emotional engagement 
with objects.   The need to habituate captive apes to novel objects is a constant reminder of this 
fact in experimental contexts.  
Caregivers to chimpanzees raised in biomedical nursery environments do not typically 
nurture object manipulations (e.g., Vauclair & Bard, 1983), however, inanimate objects are 
usually provided to stimulate well-being in captive chimpanzees from a very young age (e.g., 
Bard & Nadler, 1983).  In the Bayley (cognitive) tests, we scored the degree to which in young 
chimpanzees manipulated objects with their hands.  There were significant improvements from 
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3-5 mo through 10-12 months in manipulations (Figure 1), and significant differences among the 
different nursery rearing groups, beginning at 6 months, and continuing through the first year of 
life (Bard & Gardner, 1996).  The RC infants performed significantly better than the ST infants, 
but the LA did not differ from the ST.  Even in relatively basic skills, such as object 
manipulation, the early lived experiences of chimpanzees have a significant impact.   
Characteristics of 12-month-olds 
Locomotor Ability 
Chimpanzee infants begin to walk on (hands and) feet around 5 to 7 months of age.  This 
early locomotor ability may have an important influence on the chimpanzees developing social 
cognition (Vauclair & Bard, 1983).  Human infants begin to walk (crawling then taking first 
steps) around 12 months of age.  This means when humans first begin to coordinate their 
engagement with objects and with social partners (i.e., coordinated joint attention: Adamson & 
Bakeman, 1991) at 9 months, they are not yet able to independently locomote.  Therefore they 
engage in a lot of referential communication (e.g., asking caregivers to give them out-of-reach 
objects).  Chimpanzees at 9 months appear also to be coordinating their engagement with objects 
and with social partners (along with other tertiary circular reactions: see overview in Bard, 
1992), but since chimpanzee are able to independently locomote, they appear to bypass the 
Referential Problem Space, and typically engage is less referential communication (Leavens et 
al., 2005: see also Vauclair & Bard, 1983).  Therefore understanding developmental processes, 
here the interplay between locomotor (in)ability and the lack of need for using referential 
communication, e.g., pointing, helps us to make sense of the findings of comparative studies. 
Attachment 
A major factor of early rearing, with long term consequences for social cognition, is the 
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quality of attachment bonds.  Van IJzendoorn, Bard, Bakermans-Kranenberg, & Ivan (2009) 
found that 1-year-old chimpanzee exhibit the balance of exploration (play with toys when the 
caregiver is present) and security seeking (distress when separated from their  caregiver) that is 
found in 1-year-old humans when tested in the Strange Situation Procedure.  The chimpanzee 
infants from Yerkes were primarily secure (54%), but 33% were classified with insecure-
ambivalent, and 7% with insecure-avoidant, when classifications were conducted.   This 
compares favorably to Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall’s (1978) original sample of  US 
middle-class human infants who were 57% secure (and 42% insecure), but the relatively higher 
ambivalent classifications relative to avoidant classifications in the chimpanzees compares more 
favorably to Japanese samples with limited experiences in being alone and encountering 
strangers (e.g., Miyake et al., 1985).   
Children with disorganized attachment systems have serious problems in childhood, and 
can continue to have ‘poor emotional health’ later in life.  One cause of disorganized attachments 
is a developmental history of neglect or abuse (van IJzendoorn et al., 2009).  Whereas 15% -20% 
of non-clinical and daycare human samples have disorganized attachments, the percentage rises 
to over 60% for children living in Romanian, Hungarian, or Greek orphanages (see Figure 2).   
By 1 year of age, the attachment system of nursery-raised chimpanzees was more like that of 
human infants raised in Romanian orphanages, than like that of human infants raised in middle-
class families (van IJzendoorn et al., 2009). At 1 year of age, chimpanzees with dysfunctional 
attachments were more likely to exhibit stereotyped rocking, and tended not to contact the 
caregivers during reunion episodes but rather clutched towels (van IJzendoorn et al., 2009).   
Raising chimpanzees in biomedical centers significantly and negatively impacts their emotional 
and cognitive systems, with potentially long-lasting effects (e.g., Brune, Brune-Cohrs, McGrew, 
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Preuschoft, 2006; Kalcher, Franz, Crailsheim, & Preuschoft, 2008). 
It is important to note explicitly that the attachment system is highly influenced by early 
rearing.  Chimpanzees raised in the enriched RC nursery, compared to those raised in the 
standard care nursery at Yerkes, had significantly fewer dysfunctional attachments, had 
significantly higher 9-month cognitive scores, and were significantly less likely at 9 months, to 
exhibit an attachment to a towel.  Early experiences with caregivers during the first year of life 
have important and long-lasting effects on developmental outcomes in chimpanzees. 
Social referencing & cooperative motivations 
In social referencing experiments, when the infant looks to the caregiver, seeking 
information about the novel object, the caregiver is instructed to give an emotional message 
about the object.  Joint Attention is demonstrated when the infant (chimpanzee in this case) is 
influenced in his or her behavior toward the novel object as a result of the caregiver’s emotional 
message (e.g., Bard & Leavens, 2009; Leavens & Bard, in press).  In social referencing, the key 
is whether the chimpanzee associates the caregiver’s message, with his or her actions on the 
object.  Russell, Bard & Adamson (1997) reported that 1) all the chimpanzees, from as young as 
14 months, looked to their favorite caregiver, and engaged in alternating gaze between the 
caregiver and a novel object.  This indicates that the young chimpanzees, like human infants, 
actively seek information about the novel object from their caregiver ; 2) Moreover, their 
behavior is regulated by the emotional message that they receive.  Young chimpanzees withdraw 
from a novel object when the caregiver gives a distressed facial expression and chimpanzees 
look longer at the toy when the caregiver gives a happy expression.  Note that early rearing does 
not appear to influence the basic ability to follow another’s gaze (Pitman & Shumaker, 2009).   
Social referencing is a form of secondary intersubjectivity, in which the infant 
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demonstrates the ability to coordinate engagement with a social partner (attending to the 
emotional message given by the caregiver) with engagement with an object (to regulate 
interactions with the novel toy: Russell et al., 1997).  Clearly there can be wide individual 
differences in caregiver’s natural emotions toward objects in the world, and individual 
differences in infants’ sensitivity to emotional messages.  For example, in general, the nursery-
raised chimpanzees of the Russell et al study were more wary of the novel objects than were 
middle-class human infants.  Therefore, this developmental system of social referencing, 
common to chimpanzees and humans, can account for individual differences, as well as rearing 
group differences in outcomes for human and chimpanzee infants. 
Characteristics of 2 to 2.5 year-olds 
Mirror self-recognition (Bard, Todd, Bernier, Love, & Leavens, 2006) 
The identification of the self is a cognitive ability found in humans and great apes.  
Evolutionarily, mirror self recognition is a cognitive capacity shared by chimpanzees and 
humans – but is not present in any species of monkey, and so it is thought to have evolved in the 
past 30my (for reviews see Bard et al., 2006; Inoue Nakamura, 2001).  Developmentally, mirror 
self recognition appears to develop around 2 years in humans and in chimpanzees, although there 
has been some debate concerning the age of acquisition for chimpanzees (see Bard et al., 2006). 
An objective methodology to index self awareness in nonverbal or preverbal primates, 
the mark-and-mirror test was proposed by Gallup (1970) for comparative psychologists, and 
independently by Amsterdam (1972) for developmental psychologists.  The methods involve 
application of make-up (as used by Amsterdam for human children) or dye (as used by Gallup 
for nonhuman primates) to the face and placement of the marked individual in front of the 
reflective surface of a mirror.  If the individual used the mirror image to touch the marked area 
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on his or her own face, then this constituted behavioral evidence of understanding that the image 
in the mirror was the self, distinct from any other being.   
 In order to be more precise about age of onset, Bard et al., (2006) conducted a replication 
an earlier study, extending the age range to include more young chimpanzees.  In the design of 
this experiment, we were faced with a comparative/development dilemma:  Do we treat infant 
chimpanzees as if they were infants (and use the methods developed by developmental 
psychology), or do we treat infant chimpanzees as if they were adult chimpanzees (and use the 
methods developed by the comparative psychologists)?  We decided to take a primarily 
developmental approach, choosing to minimize distress and not to render them unconscious 
during the marking.  In fact, we marked the chimpanzees with Halloween make-up, and tested 
them while they remained with their normal social partners, in their social groups and in their 
familiar rooms.  The question was whether the infants could be exhibiting mark-directed 
behavior when they in fact did not have the cognitive ability, labeled false positives’.  
 Specifically, we proposed that the method of overt marking with make-up, while awake 
and in a social group, did not cause false positives. Two groups of human infants were tested, 
one group of 15-mo- olds (none expected to pass), and a group of 24-mo-olds (all expected to 
pass).  Did this method create self awareness in 15 month-olds?  No, it did not!  Even though the 
mark was placed on each child’s face with their full awareness, not a single 15 month-old 
touched the mark while looking the in the mirror, or passed the mark test by any criteria, whether 
mark directed or self labeling.  Even when the infants were prompted to respond, when their 
mother asked ‘Who’s that in the mirror?’, none of the 15 month olds said  their name, or gave 
any other self label.  Yet, 4 of the 5 15-month-old children demonstrated that they understood the 
task, by wiping the mark on the doll when asked to do so by the mother. 
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 In contrast, half of the 24-month-olds passed the mark test, all of the 2 year-olds labeled 
the self, and all understood the task.  Viewing the data on mirror-guided mark directed behavior 
separately from verbal self labels present another interesting finding.  Only half of the 24-month-
olds actually touched the mark, when the literature suggests that most, if not all 2 year olds 
possess self-awareness.  The amount of mark touching was comparable in the 24-mo children 
and the 28 mo chimpanzees.   This study raises questions about the age of onset of mark 
touching distinct from self labeling in the human literature, and about the influence of the social-
cultural environment on the development of self naming in the mirror (e.g., does playing 
‘naming the self games’ during the first 18 months of life faciliatate passing the test?).   
With a comparative developmental perspective applied to studies of self recognition, we 
learn that self awareness is a cognitive characteristic shared by humans and chimpanzees.  
Moreover, there are similarities in the developmental patterns, age of onset, mirror behavior, and 
probably socio-communicative variables that culminate in self awareness for both human and 
chimpanzee infants (Bard et al., 2006).  However, it appears that mirror self recognition is a 
relatively robust phenomenon in humans, as it may well be found across all human cultures (but 
see Keller et al., 2005), and little evidence exists to date that rearing environment influences age 
of onset of self recognition in chimpanzees. 
 
Advanced cognitive skills (e.g., language) 
 
The literature on ape language and ape cross-fostered projects presents overwhelming 
evidence of the impact of early experiences on social and cognitive outcomes (see review in 
Leavens & Bard, in press).  Young chimpanzees have learned symbol systems comparable to 
those learned by 2- to 4-year-old human infants (e.g., Fouts, 1997; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).  
Bard         25 
 
Young chimpanzees show self-recognition comparable to 2 year-old human infants (reviewed in 
Bard, Todd, Bernier, Love, & Leavens, 2006).  There are additional reports of triadic 
engagement in chimpanzees who do not learn symbol systems.  For example, at Yerkes in the 
responsive care program (Bard, 1996), young chimpanzees often worked jointly in activities such 
as opening a padlock with a key.  Kellogg & Kellogg (1933) reported that their son, Donald at 
18.5 months and their chimpanzee Gua at 16 months, often engaged in cooperative games, such 
as rolling a ball back and forth.  These examples illustrate commonly observed instances of 
mutual triadic engagements when chimpanzees are raised with warm relationships and 
industrially manufactured objects.  In contrast, when young chimpanzees are tested in conditions 
in which there are few triadic engagement opportunities with human testers, outcomes can be 
relatively poor (e.g., Tomonaga et al., 2004). 
      
Summary 
Emotional engagement plays a critically important role in the development of social 
cognition skills, by providing foundational motivation for the expression of competencies, or by 
actually co-constituting social cognition. Chimpanzees have inborn capacities for emotional 
engagement with caregivers, and possess developmental processes, such as neonatal imitation 
and intersubjectivity, by which emotion becomes integrated in communication and cognition.  In 
making cross-species comparisons, it is important to note the effects of early experiences and 
socialization practices, as they have a major impact on the nature and developmental trajectories 
of emotional engagements in primates, with potentially long-lasting effects.  Socialization effects 
on expressions of emotion and on regulation of emotion are evident within the first month of life 
in chimpanzees (Bard et al., 2010), and by 3 months, socialization has an impact on many social, 
emotional and interactional outcomes, such as mutual gaze (Bard et al., 2005). By 6 months, the 
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effects of early experiences become evident in cognitive outcomes in chimpanzees (e.g., early 
stress compromises attention, leading to poor cognitive performance whereas positive emotional 
experiences enhance cooperation, leading to enhanced cognitive outcomes: Bard & Gardner, 
1996).  At 8-10 months, chimpanzees spontaneously exhibit joint engagement with caregivers 
and objects, and by 1 year, emotional attachments with specific caregivers have developed.  
When caregivers are emotionally responsive, chimpanzees’ cognitive and emotional 
development is positively stimulated (van IJzendoorn et al., 2009)  Many chimpanzees raised in 
institutional settings, however, do not develop secure attachments, impairing their ability to 
emotionally engage, that can seriously compromising performance on tests of social cognition 
later in life.  The study of development in primates is important for understanding cross species 
comparisons in communication and cognition, especially social cognition. 
Primary intersubjectivity, moreover, provides the foundation for the development of 
secondary intersubjectivity.  Secondary intersubjectivity is when an infant can coordinate 
attention and action on an object with the attention and action with a social partner (reviewed in 
Trevarthen & Aitken, 2003).  We have evidence that chimpanzees engage in at least two 
different forms of secondary intersubjectivity: intentional communication and social referencing.  
Intentional communication is evident when chimpanzees point to an object while gaze 
alternating between the object and the person (Leavens et al., 2005, 2008).  Although Leavens 
and colleagues have not conducted developmental studies of intentional communication, 
fieldwork strongly suggests that referential behavior is evident as early as 9-12 months in wild 
chimpanzees, the same age as in human infants (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968). 
 I use the comparative developmental perspective to compare results from my own studies 
with those reported in the literature to arrive at an informed view of how development milestones 
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in chimpanzees compare with those in humans, and how developmental history of engagements 
might impact outcomes.  Overall, these studies show that young chimpanzees compare favorably 
to humans as newborns through to 2.5 year-olds.  Chimpanzees earlier development of motor 
skills, independently locomoting by 5-6 months in contrast to the 11-12 months of humans, has 
consequences in their developmental entry into the Referential Problem Space (Leavens et al., 
2005, 2008), and their advanced manipulative ability has consequences in assessments of early 
cognition.  However, even early developmental milestones in chimpanzees, as in humans, are 
significantly influenced by early experiences. 
Much of our scientific knowledge of ‘universal’ psychological outcomes of humans is 
based on mono-cultural data (e.g., Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  Across many domains 
of adult cognition, western adults were found to be extreme outliers when compared with 
humans raised in non-western cultures (Henrich et al., 2010).  Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard (2010) 
suggest that conclusions drawn from studies using laboratory chimpanzees similarly be viewed 
with caution.  As reviewed in this chapter, emotional and cognitive outcomes of chimpanzees are 
sensitive to socio-emotional engagement experiences.  The search for universal or species-unique 
social cognition in chimpanzees must be conducted with consideration of groups raised across 
many different ‘lived experiences’.   
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Table 1: Emotional expressions found in neonatal chimpanzees (Bard, 1998, 2003) 
 
INTEREST  JOY  UPSET/DISTRESS    ANGER    FEAR 
Brightening  Greet   Pout     Mad face    Alarm 
Effort Grunt  Smile   Fuss     Threat 
Tongue Click  Laughter  Cry 
       Cry face 
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Table 2: Imitative performance of newborn chimpanzees in two test paradigms (adapted from 
Bard, 2007) 
First Test when chimpanzees were 7-11 days old 
Structured paradigm 
  No response/no match  Match 1 model Match both models 
       Lindsey 
      Rosemary 
      Wilson 
      Claus 
      Nugget 
Interactive paradigm 
  None  Match 1 model Match 2 models Match all 3 
    Wilson   Rosemary  Lindsey  
    Claus 
    Nugget 
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Figure 1: Levels of object manipulation found in 3 different groups of nursery chimpanzees 
during their first year of life (adapted from Bard & Gardner, 1996).  Group differences indicate 
that object manipulation varies as a function of early socio-emotional experiences.  Object 
manipulation also varies as a function of age. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of human and chimpanzee 1-year-olds that have disorganized attachments 
with favorite caregivers (measured in the Strange Situation Procedure, SSP) as a function of 
early rearing environments (adapted from van IJzendoorn, Bard, Bakermans-Kranenberg, & 
Ivan, 2009). 
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